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RATIOS, (IR)RATIONALITY & CIVIL RIGHTS PUNITIVE 
AWARDS 
Caprice L. Roberts∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the charged atmosphere of tort reform and in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s federalization of due process challenges to punitive 
awards, litigants, lower courts, and commentators grapple with the 
interpretation and import of Supreme Court remedial due process 
precedent.  The Supreme Court’s seminal precedents in this area, BMW 
v. Gore1 and State Farm,2 enshrine three guideposts for review of the 
constitutionality of punitive damage awards.  The guideposts are: (i) the 
degree of reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, (ii) the ratio between 
actual or potential harm (which often translates into the compensatory 
award) and the punitive damage award, and (iii) the disparity between 
the punitive award and the sanctions available for comparable conduct.3  
The ratio prong and its corresponding jurisprudence provide heavy 
artillery for defendants seeking to invalidate or substantially reduce 
punitive awards.  Such precedent constitutes a powerful example of 
judicial tort reform that inures to the benefit of defendants.  The case law 
in this arena vividly demonstrates that “the Court has shown that it will 
aggressively police punitive damage awards, principally through the 
rubric of the Due Process Clause.”4  When the Supreme Court 
 
∗ Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law; Washington & Lee University 
School of Law, J.D.; Rhodes College, B.A.  Thank you to the Remedies Forum organizers and 
participants for reviewing drafts, providing insightful comments, and encouraging my scholarly 
endeavors.  Special thanks to Professor Doug Rendleman for his continued mentorship and to 
Andrew M. Wright for thoughtful contributions.  Thanks also for the research and editing support of 
Shelly Ann Fogarty, Justin Jack, and Bertha Romine.  The author expresses gratitude to the West 
Virginia University College of Law and the Hodges Foundation for its vital support of this project. 
 1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 3. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 4. Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages & State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. 
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pronounces in State Farm that “in practice, few awards exceeding a 
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will 
satisfy due process” and that it is obvious that “[s]ingle-digit multipliers 
are more likely to comport with due process,”5 it should come as no 
surprise that defendants of all stripes unsheathe this language as a sword 
to eviscerate jury verdicts on punitive damages.6 
For traditional tort cases with pecuniary harms, judicial and 
legislative tort reform might rein in excessive jury verdicts.7  But an 
examination of tort reform requires an inquiry into whether a chosen 
reform is the right antidote for all cases in which the reform will apply.  
Should ‘one size fit all’?  Here, the Supreme Court’s judicial reform, the 
three guideposts, applies not only to state and federal traditional tort 
cases, but also to constitutional torts and statutory civil rights cases.  In 
the latter set of cases, it is more common that nonpecuniary harms are at 
issue.  Accordingly, it is often difficult to commodify the value of such 
harms, and thus, juries in civil rights cases may award only nominal or 
very low damages for plaintiff’s actual harm.  This article will focus on 
the effect of the Court’s tightening of the ratio prong on federal civil 
rights cases.  In particular, it addresses whether federal appellate courts 
feel constrained by State Farm’s stated preference for single-digit ratios, 
or instead, jettison the ratio strictures in favor of other prongs. 
Although the Supreme Court issued a reminder that “the most 
important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is 
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct[,]”8 the Court 
did not explicitly state that courts could altogether disregard the ratio 
factor in fitting circumstances.  In dictum, the Court acknowledged that 
“ratios greater than those we have previously upheld may comport with 
 
MASON L. REV. 1, 10 (2004) (arguing that the Court incorrectly places independent reliance on state 
sovereignty and concluding that extraterritorial conduct should be permissible evidence of the 
totality of defendant’s conduct). 
 5. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 
 6. Moreover, tort reform advocates further appreciate the Court’s endorsement of a 1:1 ratio 
in certain circumstances, i.e., “[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, 
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process 
guarantee.”  Id. 
 7. Whether the Gore/State Farm three-guidepost mechanism is the most effective form of 
tort reform for its broader arena of application in traditional torts with pecuniary harms is beyond 
the scope of the instant article.  This article focuses on the mismatch of the ratio prong to 
constitutional torts and civil rights cases in particular.  The criticism raised may have implications, 
however, applicable to the broader arena.  For manageability in this Symposium piece, this article 
focuses on federal courts grappling with the ratio guideline in the civil rights context.  Certainly, 
state courts are contributing to the development of this body of law and are worthy of exploration in 
a separate piece. 
 8. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 
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due process where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a 
small amount of economic damages.’”9  The Court’s continued assertion 
that it rejects “rigid benchmarks” and “bright-line ratio[s]”10 cannot 
mask State Farm’s “swift conversion of those guides into instructions 
that begin to resemble marching orders.”11  Despite the strong temptation 
for courts to follow the Court’s “numerical controls” and fall in line with 
its preferred methodology,12 some courts, in garden-variety torts, have 
subordinated the Gore/State Farm ratio test to the reprehensibility 
prong.13  Significantly, prior to the enunciation of the Gore/State Farm 
guideposts, Professor Dan Dobbs suggested that there is an inherent 
inconsistency between the ratio and reprehensibility factors in reviewing 
punitive damage awards.14 
Civil rights violations demonstrate the problematic nature of strict 
adherence to the Court’s ratio test.  In City of Riverside v. Rivera,15 the 
Supreme Court emphasized the vital nature of the private and public 
interests at stake in civil rights cases and the importance of statutory 
incentives leading aggrieved parties to bring civil rights actions.16  
 
 9. Id. at 425 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).  The Court parenthetically noted that a higher 
ratio “might” be warranted for harms that are hard to detect or valuate, but did not provide 
examples.  Id. 
 10. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 582-83 (“We need not, and 
indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the 
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case.  We can say, however, that [a] general 
concer[n] of reasonableness . . . properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus.”) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted) (brackets and ellipses in original). 
 11. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (declining to join the Court’s 
transmogrification, even assuming the guideposts were acceptable in the first instance). 
 12. Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 13. See, e.g., Willow Inn v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming 
a 75:1 ratio – $150,000 punitive award where compensatory damages were $2,000 – because “the 
relationship between punitive and compensatory damages [was] reasonable given the degree of 
reprehensibility”); Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 347 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a 
37:1 ratio – $186,000 punitive award where compensatory damages were $5,000 on a per plaintiff 
basis – because “punitive damages should be proportional to the wrongfulness of the defendant’s 
actions”). 
 14. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(11), at 519 (2d ed., vol. 1, practitioner 
treatise series 1993) (“Even as a guideline or a ‘factor’ to be considered along with others, the ratio 
rule has little to recommend it.  It is in direct conflict with the punitive purpose of the award, which 
requires . . . the award to be proportioned to the defendant’s evil attitude and serious 
misconduct[.]”) (citing inter alia Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1173, 1181 (1931) (“instancing a hunter who fires into a crowd of people but only breaks a ten 
dollar pair of glasses; the admonition of punishment clearly should exceed the $10 figure or any 
likely multiple of that figure”)). 
 15. 477 U.S. 561 (1986). 
 16. See id. at 574 (“Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate 
important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms”); see also 
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). 
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Current case law and precedential trends demonstrate that courts are 
struggling with how to implement and fulfill the policies supporting 
private rights of action for civil rights violations while faithfully 
interpreting the Supreme Court’s precedent on remedial due process 
limits.  The problems are two-fold in civil rights line of cases: (1) some 
federal circuit courts bar punitive damages if there are no compensatory 
damages; and (2) courts reviewing a punitive award where 
compensatory damages exist may feel compelled to apply rigidly a 
single-digit ratio to comport with State Farm.  Barring or severely 
limiting punitive damages – whether on the basis of nonexistent 
compensatory damages or a dogmatic application of State Farm – does 
not comport with the typical world of civil rights violations.  For many 
civil rights plaintiffs, immunity barriers may foreclose any recovery.17  
For cases where the plaintiff survives an immunity barrier or where none 
applies, legal damages may still remain elusive.  Despite the high 
dignitary interests at stake and high public interest in enunciation of 
standards and vindicating rights, civil rights cases often involve low 
provable compensatory harm. 
So, what do courts do in the face of this mismatch?  Many find a 
way out.  Regarding general application of the ratio test, more than 
eighty cases applied State Farm during its first year on the books.18  
More than eighty percent of those courts restricted punitive damages to 
nine-to-one or less (i.e., single-digit ratios).19  This article’s review of the 
federal appellate civil rights cases that examined a challenge to a 
punitive award and addressed the ratio prong post State Farm yields 
mixed results.20  These courts struggled to apply the Gore/State Farm 
ratio principle in the civil rights context – some courts remained at single 
digits, some reduced awards to single digits, some upheld multiple 
digits, and still others escape simple categorization.  The review reveals 
 
 17. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Resurrected?: Does a Recalibrated Irreparable 
Injury Rule Threaten the Warren Court’s Establishment Clause Legacy?, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1343, 1358 (2002) (emphasizing that most Establishment Clause plaintiffs do not overcome 
immunity hurdles) [hereinafter Rendleman, Irreparability Resurrected]; Rivera, 477 U.S. at 577 
(quoting legislative history regarding § 1988 for the proposition that “it should be observed that, in 
some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only to public officials, preclude or 
severely limit the damage remedy”). 
 18. Samuel A. Thumma, Post-‘Campbell’ Cases, NAT’L L.J., June 7, 2004, at 13. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Appendix for a chart of the twenty-one federal appellate cases grappling with State 
Farm’s ratio principles.  The chart summarizes the civil rights claim at issue, the factfinder ratio, 
remittitur, the appellate ratio, and the appellate court’s rationale.  As of February 1, 2006, these are 
the universe of federal appellate cases citing to State Farm that assess punitive awards under the 
ratio guideline. 
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less than predictable results.  Thirteen civil rights cases addressed 
circumstances in which the ratio already comported with a single-digit 
framework.21 
Five civil rights cases reduced a multiple-digit award to a single-
digit.22  In one of these cases, Planned Parenthood v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists,23 complexity arose in determining what 
figures constituted the appropriate benchmarks of compensatory damage 
and punitive damage for the purposes of a ratio analysis.  The case 
involved multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants.  The defendants 
preferred a lump sum comparison of total compensatories to total 
punitives.24  The district court rejected this theory and viewed punitive 
damages per each defendant, but compensatories in aggregate.25  This 
yielded ratios of 31.8:1, 15.2:1, 9.5:1 and 6.6:1.26  The Ninth Circuit 
carved a new formulation to match each plaintiff’s individual 
compensatory award to the punitive award assessed against each 
defendant.27  This formulation yielded ratios ranging from 56.7:1 to 
12.6:1.28  Then, in the name of State Farm, the court determined that 
none of the awards should exceed a 9:1 ratio.29 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring single 
digits, which the Ninth Circuit called the “constitutional limit,”30 other 
 
 21. See, e.g., Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding a punitive award of $2.6 million for a racial discrimination claim under § 1981 as not 
excessive in light of a $360,000 compensatory award that created a constitutionally permissible 
ratio of 7:1); Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 4:1 ratio in a 
§ 1981 racial discrimination case where each of the seven plaintiffs received a $500,000 
compensatory award with approximately a $2,000,000 punitive award).  Notably, the Zhang court 
emphasized that a substantial punitive damage award – $2.6 million in favor of a Chinese employee 
– should survive in the § 1981 discrimination case because “the reprehensibility of the fraudulent 
business practices at issue in [Gore and State Farm] is different in kind from the reprehensibility of 
intentional discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity” and “intentional discrimination is a 
different kind of harm, a serious affront to personal liberties.”  Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1043. 
 22. See, e.g., Bains LLC v. ARCO Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring a 
maximum of a 9:1 ratio where the jury award resulted in either a 100:1 ratio, including a contract 
claim, or a 5,000,000:1 ratio when analyzing the § 1981 claim alone); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry 
Co., 378 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2004) (reducing a hostile environment award from 10:1 to 1:1, 
$600,000 each for punitive and compensatory damages). 
 23. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 422 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 24. Id. at 960. 
 25. Id. at 960-61. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 961-62. 
 28. Id. at 961. 
 29. Id. at 963.  The court provided an extensive chart calculating each damage award and 
notably emphasized that the figure represented was “the actual compensatory award times nine 
(rounded out), i.e., the constitutional limit of punitive damages.”  Id. at 964 n.8 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. 
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federal courts in four cases upheld double- (i.e., 10-99), triple- (i.e., 100-
999), or even quadruple- (i.e., 1,000-9,999) digit ratios.31  In a couple 
cases in which the jury awarded zero compensatory damages, the courts 
strained to meet the strictures of State Farm.  One court decided that 
rather than view the ratio as infinite, it would use the backpay award as 
the compensatory reference mark despite Title VII’s exclusion of 
backpay from compensatory damage.32  With a revised single-digit ratio 
in hand, the court affirmed a 7:1 ratio.33  Another court faced with a zero 
dollar compensatory award worried that the punitive award, despite 
being remitted from $250,000 to $175,000 in a Title VII harassment 
case, “dwarfed” the plaintiff’s potential harm.34  Accordingly, the court 
vacated the punitive award and remanded for a new trial on damages.35  
It is unclear how the new jury or the trial court conducting remittitur will 
comport with the federal appellate court’s desires for less ‘dwarfing.’ 
These courts strain to demonstrate compliance with Gore/State 
Farm’s guideposts.  Yet, if one is cognizant of the policies behind 
punitive damages and the history and goals of civil rights damages, it 
becomes evident why some courts find it difficult to be faithful to a strict 
reading of the ratio component of the Supreme Court’s guideposts. 
How can we defend subordination of ratio to reprehensibility in the 
civil rights context but not in run-of-the-mill tort cases?  What is the 
point of a ratio prong at all if reprehensibility simply provides an escape 
hatch?  Where were we before having the constitutional guideposts?36  
Rather than ensuring due process, is it arbitrary that some awards will 
 
 31. See, e.g., Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t LLC, 428 F.3d 629, 646 (6th Cir. 2005) (ordering 
remittitur to a $600,000 punitive award where compensatory damage was $279 and thus permitting 
a ratio of 2,150:1); Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
proportionality entirely as antithetical to the vindication of constitutional rights and affirming a 
150:1 ratio); Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 293 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument 
that anything above a 10:1 ratio violates due process and allowing a ratio of 110:1). 
 32. Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 535 (6th Cir. 2005).  Because a technical 
reading of the damages involved yields an infinite ratio of $100,000 in punitives to zero 
compensatories, this case is also included in the figure stated in text regarding courts that reduced 
the ratio of an award to a single digit.  Strictly speaking, however, the infinite ratio still remains if 
the backpay award is never counted.  The inclusion of this case in the category of cases that reduced 
to single-digit ratios is based on the court’s desire and belief that its manipulation brought the ratio 
into State Farm’s single-digit directive. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Austin v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 158 F. App’x 374 (3d Cir.  2005). 
 35. Id. 
 36. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (providing that the three 
guideposts must be followed to provide an “[e]xacting appellate review [that] ensures that an award 
of punitive damages is based upon an ‘application of law, rather than a decisionmaker’s caprice’”) 
(citations omitted). 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 4, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss4/7
ROBERTSFINALFINAL.DOC 2/26/2007  9:34:45 AM 
2006] RATIOS, (IR)RATIONALITY & CIVIL RIGHTS PUNITIVE AWARDS 1025 
survive despite a ratio problem while others will be shoehorned into a 
single-digit ratio pursuant to a strict application of the ratio prong?  In 
sum, does the jurisprudence of Gore/State Farm provide flexible 
guideposts that allow courts to tailor the review to the peculiarities of 
civil rights (or any other torts) in order to reach just results or do courts’ 
manipulations of precedent lay bare the indefensibility of the ratio test 
itself?  Accordingly, the premise of this article is that civil rights cases 
are particularly well-suited to demonstrate the irrationality of the ratio 
prong.37 
II.  CIVIL RIGHTS CASE TREATMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The landscape of cases relevant to this discussion diverges into two 
paths.  One set of cases constitutes a circuit split on the issue of allowing 
punitive damages for civil rights violations despite the absence of 
compensatory awards.38  The other set of cases in the civil rights arena 
post Gore hinge on the ratio prong.  Critical to understanding this 
landscape are the Supreme Court precedential data points dictating that: 
(1) the value of a constitutional right is not itself compensable;39 
 
 37. This article specifically criticizes the ratio prong because the ratio test lends itself to 
rigidity (despite attempts to couch it as “not a rigid formula”) thereby running counter to the goals 
of tort law.  The focus on the unworkability of the ratio prong in the civil rights context is used to 
demonstrate the illogic of the ratio test in general.  This focus should not be viewed as an approval 
of the disparity prong or of the Court’s disallowance of extraterritorial evidence in establishing the 
reasonableness of the punitive award.  There is much room for critique in these other areas as well.  
For a thoughtful treatment of the Court’s misinterpretation of sovereignty principles and improper 
exclusion of extraterritorial conduct, see generally Professor Michael Allen, supra note 4. 
 38. See generally David C. Searle, Keeping the “Civil” in Civil Litigation: The Need for a 
Punitive Damage – Actual Damage Link in Title VII Cases, 51 DUKE L.J. 1683 (2002); Christy 
Lynn McQuality, No Harm, No Foul?: An Argument for the Allowance of Punitive Damages 
Without Compensatory Damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 643 (2002); 
Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing a Title VII Punitive Damage Award Without an Accompanying 
Compensatory or Nominal Award: Further Unifying the Federal Civil Rights Laws, 89 KY. L.J. 581 
(2001); Kristine N. Lapinski, Prerequisites or Irrelevant? Compensatory Damages in § 1981a 
Actions for Violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Their Relationship to Punitive 
Damages, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 1199 (2001); Timothy J. Moran, Punitive Damages 
in Fair Housing Litigation: Ending Unwise Restrictions on a Necessary Remedy, 36 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 279 (2001); Justin W. Ristau, Should Punitive Damages Be Recoverable Absent a 
Finding of Actual Damages under the Federal Fair Housing Act?  Louisiana ACORN Fair Housing 
v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2000), 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 343 (2001). 
 39. See Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (holding that the 
purpose of damages under § 1983 was to compensate plaintiffs for their actual injuries and thus 
required remand to cure an erroneous jury instruction that allowed the jury to award compensatory 
damages based on the value of the constitutional rights violated).  Perhaps this precedent is worthy 
of independent criticism given, for example, that “[r]ace discrimination cases, which might be 
regarded as particularly strong cases for the notion that violation of the right is harm in itself, have 
sometimes yielded awards so low that they seem almost discriminatory in themselves.”  DOBBS, 
7
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(2) presumed damages are not recoverable;40 and (3) compensatory 
damages are awardable only upon proof of actual damage.41  The 
jurisprudential picture intensifies in light of the fact that civil rights 
plaintiffs are often unable to prove actual damages despite an ability to 
prove the violation of civil rights laws.42 
The common law tradition provides that a plaintiff cannot have a 
punitive damage award where there are no compensatory damages.43  In 
the civil rights context, this creates a real conundrum because it is 
common for plaintiffs to prove little to no compensatory damage, yet a 
jury often will award punitive damages based on the proven violation of 
a civil rights law.44  On the strict end of the spectrum, the Fourth Circuit 
prohibits awarding punitive damages without compensatory damages.45  
According to the Fourth Circuit, an award of nominal damages will not 
support a punitive award unless a statutory provision provides 
otherwise.46  A few circuits have ruled that a backpay award permitted a 
punitive award despite the nonexistence of compensatory or nominal 
damages.47  On the other end of the spectrum, certain circuits have held 
 
supra note 14, § 7.4(3), at 344 (vol. 2). 
 40. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (disallowing presumed damages in civil rights 
claims based on denial of procedural due process); see also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310-12 
(disallowing presumed damages for a substantive violation of First Amendment rights).  But see 
Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CAL. L. REV. 
1242, 1266 (1979) (criticizing this line of cases and advocating for allowance of presumed damages 
to achieve the damage goals of constitutional torts). 
 41. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992) (declaring that the purpose of damages 
under § 1983 should be to compensate for injuries caused by constitutional violations and the jury 
should award compensatory damages only upon proof of actual injury). 
 42. See DOBBS, supra note 14, § 7.4(3), at 342 (vol. 2) (“Because damages for rights 
violations very often do not cause measurable economic harm, the claims are unquantifiable; and 
because they are unquantifiable, the size of the award – often very low – may reflect the very kind 
of bias that civil rights are designed to protect against.”). 
 43. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D DAMAGES § 553 (May 2005); Gavcus v. Potts, 808 F.2d 596, 
600 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting both litigants agreed that punitive damages could not lie in the absence 
of compensatories). 
 44. See Sala v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 128 F.R.D. 210, 213 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (recognizing 
that “civil rights claims often produce only nominal damages or else declarations of rights, which do 
not translate easily into pecuniary terms”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 9 (1976); Carey, 435 
U.S. at 266); see also infra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing civil rights cases with 
nominal damage awards for compensatory harm). 
 45. See People Helpers Foundation, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 12 F.3d 1321, 1327 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding an award of 
backpay for an American with Disabilities Act case sufficient to sustain a punitive damage award 
despite no compensatory or nominal damages); Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (permitting a punitive damage award in a § 1981a case in light of a backpay award 
despite the absence of compensatory or nominal damages, but noting that a punitive award cannot 
8
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that punitive damages are available for civil rights violations even absent 
compensatory damages or backpay awards.48  Two more circuits permit 
an award of punitive damages in the absence of compensatory and 
nominal damages, but only if there is a proven violation of a 
constitutional right.49 
The principle fault line in application of the ratio test to civil rights 
cases has been whether to adhere strictly to the Court’s explicit 
preference for single-digit ratios or to nestle the case at issue in the 
Court’s dicta regarding exceptions to its single-digit benchmark.  The 
Court has attempted to soften the rigidity of its stated preference for 
single-digit formulations where “a particularly egregious act has resulted 
in only a small amount of economic damages.”50  In a wide variety of 
circumstances, courts have seized this window of opportunity in order to 
subordinate or ignore the ratio prong.  For example, in the context of 
civil rights cases decided since Gore, courts have upheld the following 
ratios – 300,000:1,51 150:1,52 110:1,53 100:1,54 59:1,55 28:1,56 and 20:1.57  
 
stand in the absence of all three); see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Sixth Circuit’s utilization of a backpay award for ratio analysis). 
 48. See, e.g., Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 271 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2001); Timm v. 
Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 49. See, e.g., Louisiana ACORN Fair Housing v. LeBlanc, 211 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2000); 
Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 50. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (quoting BMW of 
North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)).  Prior to the creation of the three guideposts, the 
Supreme Court discussed in dictum the issue of whether it is constitutionally allowable to permit a 
substantial punitive damage award in the face of a small actual damage award.  TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-60 (1993).  Notably, the Court reasoned: 
For instance, a man wildly fires a gun into a crowd.  By sheer chance, no one is injured 
and the only damage is to a $10 pair of glasses.  A jury could reasonably find only $10 in 
compensatory damages, but thousands of dollars in punitive damages to teach a duty of 
care.  We would allow a jury to impose substantial punitive damages in order to 
discourage future bad acts. 
Id.  (quoting Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 668 (1991)).  It is unclear where this 
reasoning stands in a post-State Farm world. 
 51. EEOC v. Harbert, 266 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding a $300,000 punitive damage 
award where jury awarded plaintiff $1 in nominal damages for a proven violation of Title VII based 
on sexual harassment). 
 52. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding a $15,000 punitive 
award where plaintiff had obtained only a nominal award of $100 for a § 1983 claim based on an 
unlawful search and seizure). 
 53. Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 2003) (permitting a 110:1 ratio as justifiable under 
the “egregious act” caveat after reducing the punitive award from $100,000 to $55,000 in order to 
comply with the FHA cap and expressing that the punitive award was reasonable and proportional 
to the $500 compensatory award). 
 54. United States v. Big D Enter., 184 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding 100:1 ratio in a 
racial discrimination case under the Fair Housing Act and § 1981). 
 55. Deters v. Equifax, 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding a remitted punitive award 
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In one instance, a court stated that the ratio guideline was “inapplicable” 
to the determination of the reasonableness of the award at issue because 
the Gore/State Farm ratio keys to the difference between compensatory 
and punitive damages, while the case at bar concerned only nominal and 
punitive damages.58  Another court emphasized that the “ratio guidepost 
offers little assistance” and concluded that “the use of a multiplier to 
assess punitive damages is not the best tool here.”59  The vast majority of 
 
of $295,000 where plaintiff received a $5,000 compensatory damage award under Title VII for 
repeated incidents of sexual harassment committed by multiple co-workers and a supervisor).  In 
Deters, the jury awarded $1 million in punitive damages that the district court remitted to $295,000 
pursuant to the Title VII cap.  Id.  On appeal, the defendant Equifax argued that the ratio was 
excessively disproportionate.  Id. at 1271.  The court rejected defendant’s position reasoning that 
Gore’s ratio test is “most applicable to purely economic injury cases where injury is not hard to 
detect.”  Id. at 1272-73.  Then, the court emphasized the magic window from Gore: “[L]ow awards 
of compensatory damages may support a higher ratio if a particularly egregious act has resulted in a 
small amount of economic damages.” Id. at 1273 (citing BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 582 (1996)).  The court noted that cases involving primarily personal injuries may warrant 
greater ratios.  Id. 
 56. Swinton v. Potomac, 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a $1 million punitive award 
in a racial discrimination claim where the jury awarded plaintiff $5,600 in backpay and $30,000 for 
emotional distress). 
 57. Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding a remitted 
punitive award of $625,000 in a § 1981 and § 1983 claim where plaintiff recovered $31,225 in 
compensatory damages).  The Hardeman court upheld the 20:1 ratio noting that the Gore guideposts 
are “instructive” but “not technically controlling.”  Id. at 1123 (relying on the comparable case of 
EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that ratio “alone 
does not require reduction”).  See also Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Store, 247 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 
2001) (upholding a 20:1 ratio with a $1.1 million punitive award where jury granted a $56,000 
compensatory award to African-American women who had been wrongfully accused of shoplifting 
on the basis of race).  The Hampton court justified the high punitive award on the grounds that the 
injury was hard to detect and the value of noneconomic harm hard to determine.  Id.  Then, the court 
followed Deters in holding that a primarily personal injury supports a ratio in excess of 10:1.  Id. 
(citing Deters, 202 F.3d 1262). 
 58. Williams, 352 F.3d at 1016 n.76 (noting State Farm’s presumptive invalidation of extreme 
ratios, but finding the ratio prong inapplicable because of the nonexistence of compensatory 
damages in the case).  In a § 1983 case where the jury awarded only nominal damages, but 
$200,000 in punitive damages, the Second Circuit requested that plaintiff remit to a punitive award 
of $75,000 or undergo a new trial.  See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996).  The 
court contrasted Gore’s “breathtaking” 500 to 1 ratio to a civil rights case where compensatory 
damages are nominal and declared that “a much higher ratio can be contemplated while maintaining 
normal respiration.”  Id. at 811. The court reasoned that “[s]ince the use of a multiplier to assess 
punitive damages is not the best tool here, we must look to the punitive damages awards in other 
civil rights cases to find limits and proportions.”  Id.  Ultimately, the court found that “in police 
misconduct cases sustaining awards of a similar magnitude, the wrongs at issue were far more 
egregious” and accordingly ordered remittitur or a new trial.  Id. at 812. 
 59. DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2003) (reviewing on appeal an excessive force 
claim with a $625,000 punitive award and a $400,000 compensatory award – 1.5:1 ratio – and a 
nominal award for abuse of process with a $650,000 punitive award, rejecting the ratio guidepost 
for the abuse of process claim, and ultimately ruling that despite sufficiently reprehensible conduct, 
the combined $1.275 million punitive award was excessive in comparison to similar police 
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cases upholding ratios in excess of single digits, however, rely on the 
Gore/State Farm dicta regarding particularly egregious conduct yet 
small economic damages. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 28:1 ratio in a § 1981 claim 
brought by an African-American employee who suffered a constant 
barrage of racially offensive harassment.60  As to the ratio guidepost, the 
court acknowledged that they were uncertain how to conduct this 
analysis because the punitive and compensatory damages yielded a 28:1 
ratio.61  The court maneuvered around any perceived problem by relying 
on the familiar refrain that a higher ratio may be appropriate if a 
“particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of 
economic damages.”62  Furthermore, the court relied on Gore for the 
proposition that a higher ratio is permissible where the injury is hard to 
detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm difficult to 
determine.63  The court reasoned that the case at bar was precisely the 
type posited in dicta by the Supreme Court in Gore.  According to the 
Ninth Circuit, the economic damages were lower because the aggrieved 
employee was paid a low wage ($8.50 per hour), while the personal 
indignity was difficult to calculate.64  In cases such as these, where the 
injury is primarily personal, a greater ratio may be appropriate.65  The 
court considered the wealth of the defendant,66 but found that the award 
was not excessive.67  The court noted that it did not want to rely heavily 
on other similar cases because the circumstances vary so widely.  
Accordingly, to the court, “[s]uch an exercise simply results in a scatter 
graph that pushes the decision toward a mathematical bright-line, a path 
 
misconduct cases and warranted only an award of $75,000 in punitives – resulting in a 1:3 ratio). 
 60. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 818.  The court compared the $1 million punitive damage award to 
$35,600, which represented the combined backpay and emotional distress awards, $5,600 and 
$30,000, respectively.  Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (citing BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 818 (citing Deters, 202 F.3d at 1273). 
 66. In a post-State Farm environment, it may be that defendant’s wealth may slip from its 
traditional relevance in assessing punitive damages against defendants.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 438 n.2 (2003) (noting that the Supreme Court in TXO 
acknowledged that “under well settled law,” a defendant’s “impressive net worth” was a factor 
“typically considered in assessing punitive damages[,]” and warning that “[i]t remains to be seen 
whether, or the extent to which, today’s decision will unsettle that law.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
The majority in State Farm stated that a defendant’s wealth “cannot justify an otherwise 
unconstitutional punitive damages award.”  Id. at 427 (majority opinion) (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 
585). 
 67. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 819. 
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that we eschew in accord with the Supreme Court guidelines.”68  
Ultimately, the court found that the punitive award, despite the 28:1 
ratio, comported with due process.69 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit confronted another punitive award in a 
civil rights case, but this panel dogmatically applied the ratio test to rein 
in a punitive award in a § 1981 claim and a state breach of contract 
action.70  Plaintiff Bains LLC, a corporation owned by three East Indian 
Sikh brothers, entered into a contract with defendant ARCO to haul 
fuel.71  ARCO subjected the three brothers to extreme discriminatory 
treatment by referring to them with derogatory epithets and subjecting 
them to unequal treatment in comparison with other non-Indian 
drivers.72  Despite complaints, no disciplinary action resulted and, 
instead, ARCO terminated its contractual relationship with Bains.73  
Based on the unlawful discrimination, the jury awarded $1 in nominal 
damages and $5 million in punitive damages.74  For the state breach of 
contract claim, the jury awarded $50,000.75  The district court denied 
ARCO’s post-trial motions, and ARCO challenged the $5 million 
punitive award on appeal.76  The Ninth Circuit found sufficient 
reprehensibility to warrant a punitive award.77  Regarding the ratio 
guidepost, the court relied on State Farm’s preference for single-digit 
ratios.78  For the purposes of the ratio analysis, the court utilized the 
$50,000 compensatory award for the breach of contract claim for 
comparison with the $5 million punitive award – a 100:1 ratio.79  The 
court also quoted the window of “particularly egregious act” with “small 
economic damage,” but reasoned that economic damages in the case at 
bar, $50,000, were not “a small amount” and thus, that this case was not 
the “rare case” alluded to in State Farm.80  The court concluded that the 
“controlling Supreme Court authority therefore implies a punitive 
damage ceiling in this case of, at most, $450,000 (nine times the 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 820. 
 70. See Bains LLC v. ARCO Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2005) 
 71. Id. at 767. 
 72. Id. at 767-68. 
 73. Id. at 768. 
 74. Id. at 769. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 775. 
 78. Id. at 776. 
 79. Id.  Excluding the contract claim, the ratio for the civil rights claim would be 5,000,000:1. 
 80. Id. at 777. 
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compensatory damages)” rather than the $5 million punitive award.81  
Bolstering its rationale, the court examined the third guidepost – 
disparity between the punitive award and comparable sanctions – by 
analogizing to the $300,000 statutory cap from Title VII as “an 
appropriate benchmark for reviewing § 1981 awards, even though the 
statute did not apply to § 1981 cases.”82  The court emphasized that there 
are constitutional limits to punitive damages irrespective of defendant’s 
wealth.83  Combining the ratio and disparity guideposts, the court 
remanded the case seeking a reduction of the $5 million jury award to a 
figure between $300,000 and $450,000 ratio ceiling.84 
The Eighth Circuit sliced a punitive award in a § 1981 racial 
harassment case down to a 1:1 ratio in order to comport with due process 
concerns.85  It considered the Title VII cap, noting the instant punitive 
award of $6 million was 20 times the cap.  While the court 
acknowledged that the Title VII cap does not extend to § 1981 cases, the 
“discrepancy when coupled with the other infirmities that we discern in 
this award is telling and hard to ignore.”86  The court also examined the 
ratio by comparing the $6 million punitive award to the remitted 
$600,000 compensatory award – a ratio of 10:1.  The court emphasized 
that while due process cannot be left to simple numerical ratios: 
[O]ne should not overstate the extent of the Court’s aversion to ratios. 
The Supreme Court has observed that a ratio that exceeds single digits 
pushes the outer limits of constitutionality.  It is not that such a ratio 
violates the Constitution. Rather, the mathematics alerts the courts to 
the need for special justification. In the absence of extremely 
reprehensible conduct against the plaintiff or some special 
circumstance such as an extraordinarily small compensatory award, 
awards in excess of ten-to-one cannot stand.87 
The court found that the defendant’s conduct was not so 
“egregiously reprehensible” to justify a punitive award over ten times 
the compensatory award.88  Relying on State Farm’s dictum that “when 
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only 
equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due 
 
 81. Id. at 776 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. at 777. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 86. Id. at 798. 
 87. Id. at 799. 
 88. Id.  
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process guarantee[,]” the court dramatically reduced the punitive award 
to equal the compensatory award of $600,000 creating a 1:1 ratio.89 
III.  POLICY BEHIND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Punitive damages first arose in cases of dignitary torts.  Under early 
common law rules, emotional distress was not compensable, but juries 
awarded large sums and courts upheld the verdicts.  Courts developed 
the theory of punitive damages to explain what they were doing; such 
damages were needed to deter and punish wrongdoing that might 
otherwise go unpunished and undeterred because it did no compensable 
harm.  Courts also feared that plaintiffs would take matters into their 
own hands if the law provided no effective remedy.90 
Within the context of civil constitutional harms, the ratio test fails 
to service the goals of punitive damages.  The commonly listed goals of 
punitive damages include punishment, deterrence, and litigation 
finance.91 Although contrary to doctrinal dictates,92 punitives in practice 
may fill gaps left by compensatory awards that fail to make plaintiff 
whole.93 
Reflexively, courts echo the twin pillars of punitive damage 
 
 89. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003)).  
 90. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES – CASES AND MATERIALS 727 (3d 
ed. 2002) (citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982)).  See also Douglas Laycock, The Remedies Issues: Compensatory 
Damages, Specific Performance, Punitive Damages, Supersedeas Bonds, and Abstention, 9 REV. 
LIT. 473, 499 (1990) (“Indeed, punitive damages originated as a remedy for dignitary torts at a time 
when the common law refused to compensate mental distress.”) (citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982)). 
 91. See, e.g., Dan Dobbs, Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured 
Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 844-47 (1988) (outlining the distinct goals of desert, deterrence 
(specific deterrence), example (general deterrence), litigation finance, and compensation for 
intangible injury).  See generally LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (3d ed., Michie 1995). 
 92. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 257, 266 (1981) (“Punitive damages by 
definition are not intended to compensate the injured party . . . .”). 
 93. Particularly in the civil rights context, compensatory damages leave “cavities” that 
punitives fill.  See David Partlett & Russell Weaver, Filling Cavities, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 677, 677 
(2001) (explaining that “[t]he traditional division of courses in law schools leaves cavities in the 
legal knowledge of the graduate”).  The best cure for civil rights cases might lie in 
reconceptualizing the commodification of the actual harm.  The dignitary nature of the harm at issue 
sparks difficulties in assigning dollar figures to the harm caused.  This challenge, coupled with the 
Supreme Court’s foreclosure of presumed damages in this arena, may well leave punitive damages 
as the “best second best cure for the cavity problem.”  Id. (reasoning that “a good Remedies course 
is the best second best cure for the cavity problem” caused by the traditional course design of law 
schools). 
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awards:  punishment and deterrence.94  The pillars for punitive damages 
stem from the justifications for criminal punishment.95  The two primary 
competing theories motivating criminal laws are utilitarianism and 
retributivism. 
Pursuant to classical utilitarian theory, each law should maximize 
society’s net happiness.96  The only acceptable justification for imposing 
criminal punishment occurs when the expected result is a reduction in 
the pain of crime that otherwise would occur.97  The necessary 
underpinning for this justification is that people will behave in a manner 
that seeks to avoid pain and increase pleasure (i.e., hedonistic 
behavior).98 According to a utilitarian model, an individual 
contemplating criminal activity will avoid committing a crime “if the 
perceived potential pain (punishment) outweighs the expected potential 
pleasure (criminal rewards).”99 
With this premise in mind, utilitarians most often emphasize 
“general deterrence” – by punishing an individual wrongdoer, the 
general community will refrain from criminal activity in the future.100  
Utilitarians view punishment as a means to the desired end of a net 
reduction in crime because they believe a defendant’s “punishment 
teaches us what conduct is permissible; it instills fear of punishment in 
would-be violators of the law; and, at least to a limited extent, it 
habituates us to act lawfully, even in the absence of fear of 
punishment.”101  An alternative goal of utilitarian philosophy is “specific 
deterrence” – punishing an offender will prevent that person from 
 
 94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 908(1) (1979); see also State Farm, 538 U.S. 
at 419 (2003); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985) (“It would be simplistic to 
characterize [this position] as mere blind adherence to an outmoded principle. Rather, the doctrine 
of punitive damages survives because it continues to serve the useful purposes of expressing 
society’s disapproval of intolerable conduct and deterring such conduct where no other remedy 
would suffice.”) (quoting Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled 
Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1980)). 
 95. Cf. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (stating that punitive “awards serve the same purposes as 
criminal penalties”).  See also David F. Partlett, Punitive Damages:  Legal Hot Zones, 56 LA. L. 
REV. 781, 782, 785 (1996) (noting that “the deep common law roots” of punitive damages “have not 
always been recognized, because of the modern law’s drive to divorce tort from criminal law [but 
that] the criminal law roots of tort have remained fast in the award of punitive damages”). 
 96. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION (J. Bowring ed., 1843); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863). 
 97. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 9 (2d ed. 1997). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 10. 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
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committing future misconduct.102  The catalysts for specific deterrence 
lie in the defendant’s incapacitation through imprisonment, which rules 
out criminal conduct outside the prison walls, and in intimidation of a 
defendant because the punishment will serve as a reminder that 
committing more crime will result in more pain.103 
According to a nonclassical strain of utilitarianism, the goal of 
crime reduction should be attained through rehabilitation.104  Proponents 
prefer the utilization of a reform model rather than the pejorative 
punishment framework.  They believe that future compliance to the law 
will stem from rehabilitating the defendant through reform techniques 
such as education, therapy, or even lobotomies.105 
Retributivism in its most simple enunciation validates “just deserts” 
– the fact that one deserves to be punished justifies and warrants 
punishment.106 A critical premise to the retributivist is that the defendant 
voluntarily chose to violate the rules of society and thus society may 
justly blame and punish the wrongdoer.107  Some retributivists believe 
that it is morally correct to hate criminals and to seek public revenge 
through the criminal justice system while deterring private vengeance.108  
Another retributive theory, labeled protective retribution, maintains 
that punishment will resecure society’s moral balance.109  If everyone 
follows the rules, balance exists.110  If an individual chooses to commit a 
crime and burden society, the individual’s failure to exercise self-
 
 102. JOSHUA DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 10; see also Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. 
Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 353 (2d Cir. 2002) (contrasting the distinct function of retribution and noting 
“[g]eneral and specific deterrence are also traditional justifications for punishment . . .”).  Tort law 
on punitive damages incorporates both specific and general functions of deterrence.  See Dobbs, 
supra note 91, at 844-45.  Some commentators caution, however, that “if the tort system . . . 
attempts to pick up the slack [created by other regulatory controls such as administrative and 
criminal law] via punitive damages, overdeterrence may well result.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel 
Kahneman, & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation 
in the Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2084 (1998).  
 103. DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 10.  The relevant paradigm for punitives in the civil rights 
context is the intimidation catalyst. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 11.  See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. 
Ladd translation 1965); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans., 1887).  In 
the tort punitive context, see generally Dobbs, supra note 91.  See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating that punitive damages “are private fines levied by civil juries to 
punish reprehensible conduct . . .”). 
 107. DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 11. 
 108. Id. at 12. 
 109. Id. (noting that Professor Margaret Jane Radin coined the term “protective retribution”). 
 110. Id. at 12-13. 
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restraint destroys the equilibrium.111  The wrongdoer, a morally 
responsible agent, must repay the debt owed to society in order to return 
balance to society.112  Yet another strain of retributivism focuses on 
vindicating the victim by utilizing punishment proportional to the crime 
in order to “right a wrong.”113 
Although most rely on utilitarian or retributivist theory to justify 
punishment, denunciation provides an alternative or hybrid ground for 
punishment.114  Denunciation justifies punishment as “a means of 
expressing society’s condemnation of a crime.”115 As such, denunciation 
may serve various functions, including: educating individuals that the 
community disapproves of certain behavior, channeling the anger of the 
community away from vengeance, maintaining social cohesion, and 
stigmatizing the wrongdoer.116 
These principles of criminal law provide the backdrop for the goals 
most commonly enumerated for punitive damages.  Whether one 
concludes that the utilitarians, the retributivists, or some variation of the 
two reign the day, the Supreme Court’s ratio test in the context of 
constitutional rights fails to promote most, if not all of, these 
philosophical underpinnings of punitive damages.  If anything, the ratio 
test in any machination frustrates the purpose of punitive awards.  
Although inferior federal courts are not free to jettison the ratio test, 
some courts have subordinated the ratio test to the reprehensibility prong 
in an effort to serve underlying policy goals. 
IV.  POLICY BEHIND CIVIL RIGHTS DAMAGES 
Tort policy and the legislative history of § 1983 demonstrate that 
constitutional tort damages should aim to compensate the plaintiff, deter 
violative conduct, and vindicate the aggrieved.117  Courts fashion § 1983 
damages for constitutional rights violations according to common law 
principles of tort.118  Holding punitive damages to the side, tort damages 
seek to provide “compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by 
defendant’s breach of duty.”119  The compensatory component “may 
 
 111. Id. at 13. 
 112. DRESSLER, supra note 97, at 13. 
 113. Id. (citing Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1992)). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Love, supra note 40, at 1266. 
 118. Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986). 
 119. Id. (citation omitted). 
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include not only out-of-pocket loss and other monetary harms, but also 
such injuries as ‘impairment of reputation . . ., personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering.’”120  According to the Supreme Court, 
§ 1983’s “basic purpose . . . is to compensate persons for injuries that 
are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.”121  Punitive 
damages are recoverable for the vindication of constitutional torts,122 and 
may be available where defendant’s conduct is “outrageous, because of 
the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of 
others.”123  The Supreme Court has emphasized: “[W]e discern no 
reason why a person whose federally guaranteed rights have been 
violated should be granted a more restrictive remedy than a person 
asserting an ordinary tort cause of action.”124  Adopting the common law 
standard of reckless disregard of the rights of others rather than requiring 
actual intent to injure, the Supreme Court pointed out the alliance with 
the purposes of punitive damages: “[T]o punish [the defendant] for his 
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar 
conduct in the future.”125 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorizes punitive damages in claims 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 where the defendant engages in intentional 
discrimination “with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally 
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”126  Title VII provides a 
scale capping punitive damage based on the size of the defendant 
employer with a maximum punitive award of $300,000 for an employer 
with more than 500 employees.127 
Congress did not adopt a statutory cap for § 1981 claims, and courts 
have permitted the recovery of punitive damages for such causes of 
action.128  The § 1981 cases follow the rationale of § 1983 cases for the 
allowance of punitive damages with its common law justifications. 
Regardless of well-formulated policies of civil rights laws, it is not 
uncommon to hear that the recovery of any damages at all is a faint 
 
 120. Id. at 307 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)). 
 121. Id. (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)). 
 122. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (affirming a punitive damage award in a 
§ 1983 action). 
 123. Id. at 46 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977)). 
 124. Id. at 48-49. 
 125. Id. at 55 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977)). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 539 
(1999) (limiting vicarious liability under this provision). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006). 
 128. See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac, 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001); Hampton v. Dillard, 247 
F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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aspiration for many plaintiffs who claim violations of constitutional 
rights.129  For a variety of reasons, many aggrieved individuals never 
discover the identity of the wrongdoer or will never sue to vindicate the 
right.  Then, for those who do pursue litigation, they face an uphill 
battle.  If damages remain elusive to so many despite the violation of a 
civil right, are we leaving those individuals without a remedy?  Doesn’t 
this chip away at the right itself and damage the underlying substantive 
law? 
Despite the aspirational intent of civil rights laws and constitutional 
protections, numerous obstacles lie in the path of civil rights plaintiffs.  
Many obstacles preexisted the Supreme Court’s constitutionalization of 
punitive damage awards. Such hurdles may thwart efforts to compensate 
plaintiffs and deter defendants’ wrongful behavior.  Official immunity 
poses a serious roadblock to vindicating plaintiffs’ rights in certain 
circumstances.130 The immunity doctrine potentially arises where 
constitutional violations involve state actors and in other civil rights 
cases involving public employees as defendants.  Immunity has no 
regard for the occurrence of an actual civil rights violation; it is a 
defense that is grounded in other considerations having nothing to do 
with civil rights, but rather sovereignty.  As such, an immunity defense 
is going to have the effect of systemic undercompensation for plaintiffs 
harmed by government action.  This immunity barrier, which others 
have analyzed in more detail,131 shows that civil rights plaintiffs as a 
 
 129. Rendleman, Irreparability Resurrected, supra note 17, at 1362 (noting that damages for 
violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights are “more often an aspiration rather than a policy”) 
(quoting Doug Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 KY. L.J. 531, 665, 668 
(1975)). 
 130. See, e.g., id. at 1355 (noting that plaintiffs claiming an Establishment Clause violation 
face three barriers:  “official immunity, the nature of the plaintiff’s injury, and the jury process”). 
 131. See id. (“In constitutional damages litigation, when an official defendant has invaded a 
plaintiff’s constitutional right, the plaintiff often cannot recover damages because the official enjoys 
immunity.”).  Because the immunity barrier “cuts off a plaintiff’s ability to recover her proved 
damages for the defendant’s proved violation[,]” Professor Rendleman suggests injunctive relief as 
a viable alternative for plaintiffs attempting to vindicate constitutional rights against immune 
defendants.  Id. at 1356.  Immunity does not bar injunctive relief in such settings.  Id.  According to 
Professor Michael Wells, if we assume a valid ground for the immunity defense is avoiding 
overdeterrence, “the Court should not view immunity in isolation, but should strive to accommodate 
the ‘avoiding overdeterrence’ goal with the goals of vindicating constitutional rights and deterring 
constitutional violations.”  Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common 
Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 157, 223 (1998).  Where immunity is not a barrier, Professor Wells recognizes 
the problem of the common law model that separates damages into only compensatory versus 
punitive damages and suggests that the Court should create  
federal common law to invent a new category of ‘extra-compensatory’ but avowedly 
non-punitive damages, and instruct the jury that such damages may be awarded if the 
jury decides that society’s interest in deterring a given constitutional violation requires a 
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class are already vulnerable to undercompensation before we even get to 
punitive recovery and its proportionality to compensatory damages. 
V.  MISMATCH & MISCOMMODIFICATION 
What can we learn when we zipper together the civil rights case 
treatment of the ratio prong with the remedial policies behind punitive 
damages?  What we know: 
 
• The Supreme Court has engaged in judicial tort reform in order 
to provide defendants with due process protection from runaway 
jury verdicts.  Cases triggering the court’s heavy-handed 
response stem from state jury verdicts and principally embody 
traditional torts such as bad faith, personal injury, product 
liability, and fraud. 
 
•  The Supreme Court created the Gore three-prong guideposts for 
courts (state and federal) to determine the constitutional 
reasonableness of a punitive award.  State Farm enshrined the 
ratio prong of the guideposts and emphasized a strong 
preference for single-digit ratios.  Although the Court stated that 
rare exceptions may call for higher ratios, it did not exempt any 
classes of cases or provide clear guidance for the creation of 
exceptions. 
 
•  Even though there may be certain cases that are the intended 
exceptions, judges key jury instructions to include cautionary 
language about the import of the ratio.132 
 
•  Some courts are skirting the ratio prong and the Supreme 
Court’s stated preference for single digits in favor of a focus on 
reprehensibility, while others feel duty-bound to reduce the 
punitive award to comply with State Farm’s guidance. 
 
•  Civil rights cases often result in little to no compensatory 
 
bigger payment from the defendant than the compensatory award the plaintiff would 
ordinarily receive. 
Id. at 222. 
 132. See, e.g., Jury Instructions from Bains LLC v. ARCO Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 
2005), Instruction No. 21, Punitive Damages (“In considering punitive damages you may 
consider . . . the relationship of any award of punitive damages to any actual harm inflicted on the 
plaintiff.”) (on file with author). 
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damages, even though such cases are characterized by important 
societal interests at stake and high levels of reprehensibility.133 
 
•  The Supreme Court has ruled that civil rights violations do not 
warrant presumptive damages and compensatory damages may 
not be based upon violation of the right at stake. 
 
•  A collection of federal circuit courts also strike punitive awards 
in their entirety in the civil rights arena based on transference of 
the common law maxim – no compensatories, and therefore, no 
punitives. 
 
•  Civil rights laws have been crafted in a way to foster a private 
attorney general function that supplements governmental 
enforcement.  
 
•  Punitive damages serve, at a minimum, the functions of 
punishment and deterrence.  These are independent, albeit 
related, functions. 
 
Given the potential factual scenarios involved in civil rights cases and 
the policies at stake, logic would dictate that this arena is ideal for 
punitive awards, especially given that presumed damages are not 
allowed. 
How do these points match up with the leading theories and goals 
of punishment?  The deterrence model is the intellectual brainchild of 
the utilitarian movement grounded in rational actor theory.  A strict 
adherence to ratios in the civil rights context should be of concern to 
utilitarians for two reasons: (1) it will underdeter both specifically and 
generally because small multiples of a small number of compensatories 
will systematically underdeter both the specific defendant and other 
potential future offenders; and (2) by taking away the meaningful chance 
for a significant award, the rational actor on the other side of the “v” will 
 
 133. After describing the important public benefits served by civil rights plaintiffs seeking to 
vindicate vital civil and constitutional rights that “cannot be valued in solely monetary terms[,]” the 
Supreme Court in Rivera rejected a defense argument that attorney fee awards authorized by civil 
rights statutes should be proportionate to the amount of damages that the plaintiff recovers.  City of 
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574-80 (1986).  In particular, the Court emphasized that “[a] rule 
of proportionality would make it difficult, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious civil 
rights claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain redress from the courts[,]” and that 
such a proportionality rule would be “totally inconsistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting 
§ 1988.”  Id. at 578. 
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be significantly less likely to bring suits to vindicate important 
constitutional rights. 
A retributivist perspective might well center on an assessment of 
the moral value of the violation committed.  This issue carries 
quantification problems that parallel the difficulty of commodifying 
dignitary harms.  If a retributivist, however, would place a high value on 
the importance of respecting civil and constitutional rights, then the 
current remedial scheme is likely to fail to punish adequately 
lawbreakers in this arena.  Of course, criminal law also has core 
concerns regarding the proportionality of punishment.  Although the 
ratio guidepost sounds like proportionality, criminal law focuses on 
reprehensibility and further allows strong punishment of crimes of 
attempt where there is no actual harm.  This may relate to the ratio test’s 
original phrasing as a comparison of punitives to “actual or potential 
harm,” but many courts in the civil rights arena have been fixated on the 
actual harm proven in the form of compensatories rather than the 
philosophically potential harms to the individual or to society generally. 
In addition to the ratio focus’s disharmony with the philosophical 
underpinnings of punishment, the varied court treatment of punitive 
damages and the ratio guidepost also demonstrates the need for reform 
of the judicial tort reform already in place.  The ratio test is inconsistent 
with the reprehensibility prong.  Civil rights cases paint a particularly 
helpful picture of the unworkability and irrationality of the ratio 
prong.134  The lessons learned in this arena should extend beyond civil 
rights cases.  Mathias and Willow Inn signal that courts in realms outside 
civil rights subordinate ratio to reprehensibility,135 while other courts 
strictly adhere to the strong preference for single-digit ratios.136  Does all 
of this evidence confirm the wisdom of the Supreme Court in fashioning 
a flexible guidepost that provides courts the wiggle room they need to 
treat different cases differently?  Or, are the fact scenarios in civil rights 
cases laying bare the flawed nature of the precedential line? 
Perhaps the Court hoped to sharpen the ratio guidepost in order to 
show that it could constrain its children (including state supreme 
 
 134. Justice Scalia refuses to give Gore stare decisis effect and calls into question the whole 
body of “punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from BMW v. Gore [because it] is 
insusceptible of principled application.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 
429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. id. (Thomas, J., dissenting on the basis of inapplicability of 
the Constitution to the size of punitive awards). 
 135. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing traditional tort cases in which the 
courts subordinated the ratio prong to the reprehensibility prong). 
 136. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (exploring courts that reduced punitive 
awards in order to comport with a single-digit ratio). 
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courts)137 and institutionally defend itself against attacks of out-of-
control jury awards.  Certain defense interests continue to clamor for 
even more protection from the courts and legislatures.  They seek a rigid 
numerical benchmark (of course, they would prefer the abolishment of 
punitive damages), and sometimes they are victorious in receiving it.  To 
combat arbitrariness, they have suggested mimicking the sentencing 
guideline structure.  Would that clarify the situation? 
Of course, defendants generally desire certainty and predictability, 
but punitive damages historically lend unpredictability in order to avoid 
the Pinto temptation of subordinating the moral imperative to economic 
justification.138  Constitutional due process does not require certainty and 
predictability in punitive awards.  Rather, according to the Supreme 
Court, due process commands that awards not be grossly excessive or 
arbitrary.139  In reaction to unsatisfactory state common law standards 
governing punitive awards, the Court established the three guideposts.140  
Pursuant to the ratio prong, the reasonableness of awards should in part 
hinge upon a comparison of compensatory damages to punitive 
damages.141  Yet, this comparison assumes that there is logic to the 
application of a searching for a ratio with an eye towards closing the gap 
between punitive and compensatory awards until, in the Court’s ideal 
framing, one hits the single-digit nirvana.  Keying off the compensatory 
award as the foundation further assumes that the legal system correctly 
captures the commodification of harm in its compensatory award.  The 
assumptions are fundamentally flawed in certain respects.  For example, 
consider the following posed by Professor Doug Laycock: 
Which way does the amount of compensatory damages cut?  Courts 
often say that punitive damages must be in a reasonable ratio to 
compensatory damages.  The suggestion is that the smaller the 
 
 137. Perhaps stepchildren who have passed the age of majority would be closer to the mark.  
The Supreme Court may be acting as an institutional parent over state supreme courts via 
substantive due process.  Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and states’ rights advocates assert that the 
state supreme courts should maintain their right to have the final say over the punitive damages 
stemming from state laws.  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 138. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 777, 813 (1981) (regarding 
Ford’s failure to correct defects in its Pinto car design, the court found “evidence that Ford could 
have corrected the hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to defer correction of the 
shortcomings by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against 
corporate profits.”). 
 139. See State Farm, 517 U.S. at 416-17 (describing the procedural and substantive federal 
constitutional limitations). 
 140. BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 141. Id. 
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compensatories, the smaller the punitives.  Isn’t that backwards?  If 
part of the rationale for punitives is to deter wrongful conduct that does 
little measurable harm, and to express and channel outrage at such 
conduct, aren’t small compensatories an argument for larger 
punitives?142 
The inference of the questions posed by Professor Laycock raises 
an interesting point given his recitation of the origin of punitives.143  
According to Professor Laycock, “[p]unitive damages are necessary 
primarily when compensatory damages are small.”144  He also posits the 
illogic of the ratio principle where compensatory damages are large 
enough to punish or deter obviating the need for punitives.145  In 
particular, he explains that, in the Pennzoil litigation, the court’s award 
of $7.5 billion in compensatory damages and a remitted $2 billion in 
punitive damages demonstrates one critical point regarding punitives: 
“[T]he traditional notion that punitive damages should be proportionate 
to compensatory damages is absurd.”146 
Ratios generally say nothing about the appropriateness of punitives.  
Ratios send a nice message that the Court will step in to reform the 
judicial system in favor of defendants and give everyone a sense of 
mathematical precision in an arena rife with gray areas.  The Court 
intends the ratio guidepost to curtail arbitrary awards.  What the ratio 
actually does is create an illusion of precision in an unstable world.147  
Imprecision, however, may be itself an asset in the punitive context.148  
 
 142. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, supra note 90, at 737. 
 143. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 144. Laycock, The Remedies Issues, supra note 90, at 499.  He cautions, however, that it would 
be “an oversimplification to state that punitive damages should be inversely proportional to 
compensatory damages, but that would come closer to good sense than the existing rule.” Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. “In truth, the [Gore majority’s three] ‘guideposts’ mark a road to nowhere; they provide 
no real guidance at all.”  BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,  605 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  The advocates of Gore’s guideposts were unable to convince Justice Scalia to join the 
majority’s reasoning seven years later despite the rule of stare decisis.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I am also of the view that the 
punitive damages jurisprudence which has sprung forth from BMW v. Gore is insusceptible of 
principled application; accordingly I do not feel justified in giving the case stare decisis effect.”). 
 148. In Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985), the court reasoned: 
[T]he lack of any precise formula by which punitive damages can be calculated is one of 
the important assets of the doctrine. ‘Punitive damages . . . can be individualized to 
provide a deterrent that will be adequate for each case.’  Such flexibility can ensure a 
sufficient award in the case of a rich defendant and avoid an overburdensome one where 
the defendant is not as wealthy.  Flexibility is also necessary to avoid situations where 
the potential benefits of wrongdoing could outweigh a known maximum liability.  In 
short, ‘[a]lthough a quantitative formula would be comforting, it would be undesirable.’ 
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When applied rigidly, it leaves the aggrieved and the right 
undervindicated while the defendant remains underdeterred and 
underpunished.  When some courts subordinate the ratio test and others 
do not, are we any closer to eradicating the very arbitrariness the Court 
claims due process protects against? 
Perhaps a singular focus on punitive damages in the civil rights 
context misses a deeper discomfort with the valuation of dignitary 
harms.149  Dignitary harms present serious problems of valuation.150  The 
commodification of such harms – and the jury’s role as the commodifier 
– has generated great controversy and is a continued source of 
consternation for legal commentators, litigants, and jurists. 
The focus on punitive damages in the civil rights arena is a function 
of the Supreme Court’s determination that presumed damages are not 
available for civil rights plaintiffs.151  According to Professor Dan 
Dobbs, presumed damages potentially serve three purposes depending 
upon which court or commentator is using the term: (1) to compensate 
for harm that is presumed to exist, but difficult or impossible to prove; 
(2) to assign value to the right violated without consideration of the 
plaintiff’s actual harm beyond the right; and (3) to encourage suits to 
vindicate those rights “especially when any citizen’s loss of the right 
may tend to diminish the rights of others as well.”152  The Supreme 
Court has dispensed with any vehicle to serve the first two rationales.  
The first rationale shares a common policy genesis with punitive 
damages.153  The Supreme Court expressly prohibited the second 
 
Id. at 1359 (quoting Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 648-49, 657, 666 
(1979) (emphasis added)). 
 149. Dignitary harms “involve some confrontation with the plaintiff in person or some indirect 
affront to his personality.”  DOBBS, supra note 14, at § 7.1(1), at 259 (vol. 2).  While at common 
law such dignitary harms included a host of torts like assault, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and others, “these torts have 
their statutory and constitutional analogues . . . including federal or state civil rights statutes.”  Id. 
 150. Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2003) (justifying the 
need for the availability of punitive damages, in part, because compensatory damages “are difficult 
to determine in the case of acts that inflict largely dignitary harms”); see also Mathie v. Fries, 121 
F.3d 808, 814 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that, where prison director sodomized and raped plaintiff, the 
lower court “faced a difficult task in attempting to value the trauma suffered . . ., both because the 
extent of emotional injury does not readily translate into dollar amounts and because few truly 
comparable cases can be found”). 
 151. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (disallowing presumed damages in civil rights 
claims based on denial of procedural due process); see also Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 
477 U.S. 299 (1986) (disallowing presumed damages for a substantive violation of First 
Amendment rights). 
 152. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 7.1(2), at 261 (vol. 2). 
 153. See LAYCOCK, supra note 90. 
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rationale.154  The third rationale echoes the criminal law principles of 
deterrence and retributivism.  Without the vehicle of presumed damages, 
punitive damages theoretically remain available.  Punitive damage 
application, however, in generic tort cases and its subsequent 
ensnarement in tort reform battles and culture wars has led to a body of 
case law that threatens the only remaining vehicle to serve these two 
important purposes in civil rights cases, which presumed damages were 
also designed to protect.  The resulting body of precedent is disjunctive 
with the entire purpose of civil rights laws. 
The Court prohibits allowing presumed damages for the dignitary 
harm that occurs in civil rights cases, and it further bars the inclusion of 
the harm to the right itself as a part of compensatory damages.  Several 
circuits prohibit civil rights plaintiffs from recovering for emotional 
distress harm without introducing corroborative expert testimony.155  For 
civil rights plaintiffs who possess little to zero provable actual harm, the 
ratio ties to a compensatory award that will not in fact compensate for 
the harm suffered.  What is the harm suffered?  Is it possible that our 
system which generally does the best it can does not have a mechanism 
to commodify adequately the dignitary type of harm endured?  There is 
the dignitary harm to the individual plaintiff, harm to “absent plaintiffs” 
or “quasi-plaintiffs,”156 harm to society,157 harm to tort laws and 
 
 154. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310. 
 155. “[D]eprivation of constitutional rights may be awarded only when claimants submit proof 
of actual injury.”  Patterson v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 938 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Carey, 435 U.S. at 255-56) (noting that the Supreme Court has not limited this proof requirement to 
§ 1983 and thus applying the reasoning to all federal claims for emotional distress).  The court 
provided that many “sister circuits have recognized that claimant’s testimony alone may not be 
sufficient to support anything more than a nominal damage award.”  Id. (citing the Third, Sixth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts).  In essence, the court required physical manifestations and 
corroborating testimony by a medical or psychological expert in order to recover emotional harm.  
Id. at 938-39. 
 156. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 
392 (2003) (“‘Absent plaintiffs’ might be thought of as individuals with present legally cognizable 
tort injury claims, and ‘quasi-plaintiffs’ as similarly situated individuals, harmed to some lesser 
degree and thus lacking legally cognizable tort injury claims.”). 
 157. Professor Sharkey discusses “[d]iffuse harms” which she defines as “a residual category 
of widespread harm cases in which the harm extends beyond the individual plaintiffs and other 
specifically identifiable individuals.”  Id. at 400.  In response to objections to punitive damages on 
the grounds of extraterritoriality and multiple punishments, Professor Sharkey offers a solution that 
would reconceptualize punitive damages as societal compensation.  Id. at 401.  She opines that such 
a reconception of underdeterrence damages into societal compensation damage  
would seem to survive the retributive-punishment-focused due process constraints of 
State Farm . . . [and] favor a new kind of distributive scheme that would attempt either 
to compensate society directly for the imposition of those harms or else to direct 
compensation to some proxy that would attempt to compensate categories of individuals 
likely harmed by a defendant’s similar wrongdoing. 
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principles, and harm to the Rule of Law itself. 
Perhaps a useful analogy is to hate crime legislation.158  Such 
legislation enhances the penalty if the defendant committed the crime 
with certain improper motives.  This legislation does not place greater 
weight on the victim, but rather recognizes the harm imposed on society 
is increased when the wrongdoer carries an improper motive.  The 
criminal laws increasing penalties for killing police officers similarly do 
not value a police officer’s life more than another citizen’s, but rather 
enhance punishment based on the harm to the respect for the Rule of 
Law and societal safety.  Criminal law takes stock of these values and 
translates the value into enhanced penalties.  Such enhancement 
mechanisms in the criminal arena may serve as wiser analogies under 
State Farm’s third disparity prong than importing a cap from a 
comparable civil sanction and grafting that cap onto a law where 
Congress has not included such a cap.159  In the context of punitive 
damages for civil rights violations, the damages do not value these 
victims more, but rather reflect the greater harm to society when 
defendants violate such laws. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While excessive punitive damage awards give rise to legitimate 
concern and tort reform, a single-digit ratio test is an irrational reform as 
applied to civil rights cases.  We should exercise caution before 
extinguishing access to meaningful punitive damages for those classes of 
cases – here civil rights – out of which the rationale for punitive 
damages arose.  Strict adherence to a single-digit ratio between punitive 
damages and compensatory damages threatens to do just that.  As we 
evaluate courts’, and our own, discomfort with rigid ratios in this 
context, we should ask ourselves if that discomfort “spilleth over” to 
 
Id. at 401-02.  With this solution, she hopes to effectuate deterrence, fairness, and corrective justice 
while avoiding the now-embedded and presumed windfall to the plaintiff.  Id. at 353-54. 
 158. Almost every state has passed hate crime legislation.  See Gregory R. Nearpass, 
Comment, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and Practical Concerns to Penalty-
Enhancement Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 547, 548 (2003) (contending 
that hate crime enhancements constitute a double jeopardy violation). 
 159. Compare Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004) (declining 
to extend Title VII’s cap to § 1981 because “it would be inappropriate for the courts simply to 
extend the Title VII limitation to § 1981 cases under the guise of interpreting the Constitution” 
where “Congress made the implicit judgment not to limit damages in § 1981 cases.”), with Bains 
LLC v. ARCO Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 777 (9th Cir. 2005) (providing that, pursuant to the 
disparity prong analysis, the Title VII cap was the proper benchmark for punitive damages in § 1981 
cases). 
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